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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
MARCY ANN HARRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20011021-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of 
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether defense counsel's failure to make a motion for directed verdict and/or 
arrest of judgment constituted ineffective assistance of counsel? "A defendant raising 
an ineffectiveness claim must show first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that counsel's performance 
prejudiced the defendant. To establish prejudice, defendant must show a reasonable 
probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have been different." 
State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 25, 1 P.3d 546. 
l 
CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
All relevant statutory and constitutional provisions are set forth in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Marcy Ann Harris appeals from the judgment, sentence and commitment of the 
Fifth District Court after being found guilty as charged to Driving Under the Influence 
of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44. 
B. Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition 
Marcy Ann Harris was charged by information filed in Fifth District Court on or 
about July 11, 2000, with driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44 (R. 5,6). 
On November 9, 2000, at the pretrial conference, Harris plead not guilty to the 
above charge (R. 37). At trial, on September 17, 2001, the jury was instructed to the 
following elements of the crime of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs: 
1. The defendant operated a vehicle; and 
2. The defendant was in the state of Utah when she operated a vehicle; and 
3. The defendant, while operating a vehicle: 
(a) had sufficient alcohol in her body that a chemical test given within two 
hours of the defendant operating a vehicle shows that the defendant had a 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or greater of alcohol for each 
210 liters of breath; or 
(b) was under the influence of alcohol and/or any drug to a degree that 
rendered her incapable of safely operating the vehicle. (R. 93). 
Harris was tried and convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol, a Class A 
Misdemeanor (R. 98). 
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On November 29, 2001, based on Harris's conviction of Driving Under the 
Influence of Alcohol, Harris was sentenced to ten (10) days of jail, the sentence stayed 
pending appeal (R. 119). Harris was placed on probation for 24 months, and ordered 
to pay a SI ,500 fine and to perform 50 hours of community service (R 119-20). 
STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS 
On July 5, 2000, Officer J Van Fleet was di.spat.cl: led to a fai nil> figl it ii I progi ess 
(R. 3). At the scene, Officer J. Van Fleet arrested Harris for DUI (R. 3). 
Brandy Nebeker, a witness for the State, testified tl lat she \v as a friend of Marcy 
Ann Harris and that she and Harris were sun tanning the afternoon of July 5, 2000, prior 
to Harris's arrest (R 136 at 13, 16) Nebeker testified tl lat di iring tl le tii i le si lie ai id I larris 
were laying out, Harris consumed "maybe a beer and a half. Not more than two beers" 
(R. 136 at 2( : larris cor *• his testimony, testifyinu that she rmisumed line two 
beers over about an hour to an hour and a half period while sunbathing (R. 136 at 125). 
Nebeker testified that during this tii i le, she told I larris that Ji istin Robb, 1 lei tl len 
boyfriend, had tried to call Harris because his number was on Nebeker's caller I.D. (R. 
136 at 14, 20). 1 larris testified that she was scared to call Robb, ami she "liiull i lliiiik ml 
a story first" before calling him (R. 136 at 123). Harris testified that as she spoke with 
Robb on the phoi le. he v\ as i i lad and 1 le was i isil lg pi ofai lity (R 136 at 123) I larris 
stated that Robb told "me to get to his house or he'd come over & beat the f-— out of 
me." (R. 1 OS). I larris fi irther testified tl tat she told R obb she had been drin king so that 
she would not have to go and talk with him (R. 136 at 123). Harris testified that Robb 
said he did not care and wanted !• " • me meet hii i I at iry vv ay (R 136 at 123) Harris 
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testified that she decided to drive and meet Robb "so it didn't escalate the situation any 
more than what it was already" (R. 136 at 124). Harris testified that she took her son 
with her (R. 136 at 124). Harris further testified that she felt she was not under the 
influence to the point that she could not operate her vehicle safely (R. 136 at 125). 
Harris testified that after she met with Robb, she returned to Nebeker's apartment 
(R. 136 at 128). Nebeker testified that when Harris came back from meeting Robb, Robb 
was not with her although Robb showed up later (R. 136 at 15, 21-22). Harris also 
testified that Robb was not right behind her when she arrived at Nebeker's apartment (R. 
136 at 128). 
Harris testified that when she arrived at Nebeker's apartment, she hurriedly 
grabbed her son out of the car and went in and started talking to Nebeker about what just 
happened between her and Robb (R. 136 at 128-9). Harris testified that she later let her 
son out of the apartment and she went to her car to "grab my purse and smokes and stuff 
out of the car" (R. 136 at 130). Harris further testified that after she arrived at Nebeker's 
apartment, she grabbed the quart of beer out of the refrigerator and drank it (R. 136 at 
130). Nebeker also testified that after Harris returned from driving to see Robb, she saw 
Harris consume a quart of beer (R. 136 at 22, 24). Nebeker further testified that she had 
"no question" in her mind that Harris drank the quart of beer after she returned from 
meeting with Robb (R. 136 at 25). Nebeker further testified that between the time that 
Harris returned from meeting Robb and before Robb showed up banging on her door, 
she had time to take a shower (R. 136 at 23). 
Harris testified that as she was outside smoking, Robb pulled up and she "ran back 
and told Brandy [Nebeker] call the cops" (R. 136 at 130). Harris testified that she then 
"ran out to grab [her son] because he was on his way out to the play ground.... And he 
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[Robb] took my keys from me" (R. 136 at 130-1). Harris testified that she got away from 
Robb and went back into the apartment and shut the door behind her (R. 136 at 131). 
Nebeker testified that when Robb showed up. "he banged on my door' (R.136 at 15). 
Nebeker testified that after Robb was banging on her door. Harris asked Nebeker to call 
911, which she did (R. 136 at 15, 23). 
Justin Robb testified that after he met up with Harris at the St. George Auto Body, 
he followed her to the Maverick station, but stopped at the Maverick to cool down (R. 
136 at 29-30). Robb also testified that he stayed at the Maverick to cool down "because I 
knew I was bent the hell out of shape and if I went any further right then with that 
attitude it wasn't going to get me nowhere" (R. 136 at 34). 
Robb testified that after attempting to locate Harris at her home, he went to 
Nebeker's home and found Harris's car there (R. 136 at 35). Robb testified that at this 
point, he was still upset with Harris (R. 136 at 29). Robb also testified that as he got to 
Nebeker's home, Harris was outside and "I grabbed the keys from her" because "I think 
she might have been drinking, but and I was probably real pissed off too" (R. 136 at 31-
32). Robb further testified that he told the officer at the scene that he thought Harris had 
been drinking, although Robb testified that he "never seen her with no alcohol in her 
presence at all" nor had he smelled alcohol on her breath (R. 136 at 29, 33). Robb also 
testified that when he was driving and following Harris, it did not appear to him that 
Harris was impaired while driving (R. 136 at 34). 
A. Testimony of Officer James Van Fleet 
Officer James Van Fleet testified that he is a police officer with the St. George 
City Police Department (R. 136 at 44). Van Fleet testified that on July 5, 2000, "I 
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received a call of a family fight/disorderly conduct situation of a male banging on a front 
door of a residence" (R. 136 at 44). Van Fleet testified that he responded to the call and 
made contact with Robb, "'my first contact with anybody in this situation" (R. 136 at 44-
5). Van Fleet testified that Robb appeared upset and agitated (R. 136 at 45). Van Fleet 
testified that Robb showed him the keys that Robb had taken from Harris (R. 136 at 45). 
Van Fleet further testified that Robb told him that Harris was driving and drinking (R. 
136 at 45). 
Van Fleet also testified that when he was at Nebeker's home, Harris told him that 
she had driven to meet Robb (R. 136 at 47). Van Fleet further testified that when he was 
speaking with Harris, he "spelled [sic] the odor of alcohol coming from her as I talked 
with her" (R. 136 at 48). Van Fleet testified that after other officers cited Robb for 
disorderly conduct, he changed his focus on Harris and a possible DUI (R. 136 at 49). 
Van Fleet testified at this point, "I started asking questions of what she did, what 
she was doing during the day" (R. 136 at 49). Van Fleet testified that Harris told him she 
had been drinking alcohol (R. 136 at 49). Van Fleet also testified that Harris told him 
that she took her child and drove to see Robb (R. 136 at 50). Van Fleet further testified 
he asked Harris if she "had anything to drink since you, since you last drove, since you 
pulled the car in the parking lot" and she said no (R. 136 at 51). Van Fleet also testified 
that "I was under the impression that when she came home she had time to get her son 
out of the car and very shortly thereafter Justin [Robb] came and started banging on the 
door" (R. 136 at 52). 
Van Fleet testified that after concluding that Harris had been driving under the 
influence, he "performed some field sobriety tests to determine her level of impairment 
through a set of tests... which she agreed to go through" (R. 136 at 53). Van Fleet 
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testified that he performed several field sobriety tests, all of which she failed (R. 136 at 
54-62). These tests included the finger to nose test, the finger count test, the walk and 
turn test, the one leg test, and the horizontal gage nystagmus test (R. 103, State Exhibit 
#1). Van Fleet testified that at this point, he could not recall whether he had Harris 
perform a portable blow test before placing her under arrest or after he placed her under 
arrest for DUI (R. 136 at 62). In Officer Van Fleet's Probable Cause Statement, he stated 
"I determined that Marcy [Harris] was impaired and arrested her for DUI" (R. 3). Also 
in the Probable Cause Statement, Van Fleet found out that Harris had a statewide warrant 
and "I booked her for DUI and a statewide warrant'' (R. 3). 
Van Fleet testified that after he arrested her, he took her to the police station and 
explained to her that she was under arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol (R. 
136 at 64). Harris testified that she was arrested for a prior warrant and that she did not 
know that she was being arrested for DUI when she made her written statement and 
when she made her oral statements to Officer Van Fleet (R. 136 at 153). On cross 
examination, Harris testified that Officer Van Fleet did tell her she was being arrested for 
DUI when he performed the chemical test (R. 136 at 155). 
Van Fleet also testified that he had Harris perform the intoxilyzer test at the police 
station (R. 136 at 71). The intox test was performed at 6: 39 p.m. (R. 136 at 94). The 
results showed that Harris had a .121 breath alcohol level (R. 103, State Exhibit #2). Van 
Fleet testified that after Harris performed the intoxilyzer test at the police station, he read 
Harris her Miranda rights at 7:14 p.m. (R. 136 at 72-3). Van Fleet further testified that 
Harris agreed to talk to him (R. 136 at 73). 
Van Fleet testified that he first asked Harris if she was operating a vehicle, which 
she admitted to (R. 136 at 73). Van Fleet testified that he next asked her where she was 
7 
driving to and what time she had left (R. 136 at 74). Van Fleet testified that Harris said 
she was going to see Justin Robb and she left around 5:30 p.m. (R. 136 at 74). Van Fleet 
testified that he next asked what time it was right now, and she said it was 6:45 p.m. (R. 
136 at 74). Van Fleet testified that the actual time was 7:15 p.m. (R. 136 at 74). Van 
Fleet testified that he then asked what and how much had she been drinking, and Harris 
answered one quart and two 12 ounce beers (R. 136 at 74). Van Fleet further testified 
that he asked Harris when she had her first and last drink, and Harris "indicated that her 
first was at 3:15 and her last drink was at 5:00 o'clock" (R. 136 at 75). 
Van Fleet further testified that at this point, he un-handcuffed Harris and she 
agreed to fill out a witness statement (R. 136 at 76). Van Fleet testified that he watched 
Harris fill out the statement form, but he failed to sign it and Harris failed to sign the 
voluntary witness statement (R. 136 at 78). 
At one point in his testimony, Van Fleet testified that he first informed Harris of 
her Miranda rights at 7:14 p.m. (R. 136 at 72). Van Fleet also testified that after arriving 
at the police station, the first thing he did was fill out the DUI citation form (R. 136 at 
64). At another point in his testimony, Van Fleet testified that he served a copy of the 
DUI citation at 7:20 p.m., the time at which Harris was filling out her voluntary 
statement (R. 136 at 94-5). Harris testified, "I don't think he gave me the DUI citation 
until after I'd gotten to Purgatory [Correctional Facility]" (R. 136 at 153). 
Van Fleet also gave testimony about the situation that took place between Harris 
and Robb before Van Fleet arrived on the scene. (R. 136 at 89). Van Fleet testified, 
"what I determined from, reading this statement was that she, all in all she was at the 
Maverick, she saw an opportunity to leave Justin [Robb] and so she, she took off and 
went to Canyon Place, she pulled into the parking lot. And it appears from what her 
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statement is that she went in the house, then she came back out to get her child. When 
she went back out to do that she had her keys in her hand. Justin pulls up. He's upset 
because she had been drinking and driving. Grabs, twists her arm. grabs the keys out of 
her hand. She grabs her child, goes in the house, closes, locks the door. And he starts 
pounding on the door. We get called. Six minutes later I show up." (R. 136 at 89). 
Van Fleet testified that he did not know what time Robb had called Nebeker's 
place looking for Harris, "I assumed that it was before 5:00 o'clock is when the calls 
came in." (R. 136 at 91). Van Fleet also testified, "I kind of inferred from her statements 
that she had a drink at 5:00 and then left to go and find Justin [Robb]." (R. 136 at 92). 
Van Fleet further testified that he arrived at the scene at 5:46 (R. 136 at 93). 
During Cross examination, Van Fleet testified that he never saw Harris drive (R. 
136 at 99). Van Fleet further testified that Robb never told him that Harris drove in a 
manner that indicated she was under the influence. 
B. Testimony of Marcy Ann Harris 
Marcy Ann Harris testified that she was at Brandy Nebeker's house on July 5, 
2000, sunbathing (R. 136 at 118-9). Harris testified that Robb called Nebeker's house 
about five times while she was sunbathing (R. 136 at 123). Harris testified that she was 
scared to call Robb, and she "had to think of a story first'' before calling him (R. 136 at 
123). Harris testified that as she spoke with Robb on the phone, he was mad and he was 
using profanity (R. 136 at 123). Harris further testified that she told Robb she had been 
drinking so that she would not have to go and talk with him (R. 136 at 123). Harris 
testified that Robb said he did not care and wanted her to come meet him anyway (R. 136 
at 123). Harris testified that she decided to drive and meet Robb "so it didn't escalate the 
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situation any more than what it was already" (R. 136 at 124). Harris testified that she 
took her son with her (R. 136 at 124). 
Harris testified that before she drove to meet Robb, she had consumed "about two 
beers" (R. 136 at 125). Harris also testified that she felt she was not under the influence 
to the point that she could not operate her vehicle safely (R. 136 at 125). Harris further 
testified that she consumed the two beers over a period of an hour to an hour and a half 
(R. 136 at 125). 
Harris testified that after she met Robb, she drove back to Nebeker s apartment 
(R. 136 at 128). Harris testified that when she arrived at Nebeker's apartment, she 
hurriedly grabbed her son out of the car and went in and started talking to Nebeker about 
what just happened between her and Robb (R. 136 at 128-9). Harris further testified that 
Robb was not right behind her when she arrived at Nebeker's apartment (R. 136 at 128). 
Harris testified that she later let her son out of the apartment, and she went to her 
car to "grab my purse and smokes and stuff out of the car" (R. 136 at 129). Harris 
further testified that after she arrived at Nebeker's apartment, she grabbed the quart of 
beer out of the refrigerator and drank it (R. 136 at 130). Harris testified that as she was 
outside smoking, Robb pulled up and she "ran back and told Brandy [Nebeker] call the 
cops" (R. 136 at 130). Harris testified that she then "ran out to grab [her son] because he 
was on his way out to the playground.... And he [Robb] took my keys from me" (R. 136 
at 130-1). Harris testified that she got away from Robb and went back into the apartment 
and shut the door behind her (R. 136 at 131). 
Harris testified that she made the written statement (R. 136 at 134, 146). Harris 
testified that she did not tell Officer Van Fleet that she drank the quart of beer after she 
was driving (R. 136 at 143). 
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Harris further testified that she was arrested for a prior warrant and that she did 
not know that she was being arrested for DUI when she made her written statement and 
when she made oral statements to Officer Van Fleet (R. 136 at 153). Harris testified "I 
don't think he save me the DUI citation until after Yd gotten to Pursatorv" (R. 136 at 
153). On cross examination, Harris also testified that Officer Van Fleet did tell her she 
was being arrested for DUI when he performed the chemical test (R. 136 at 155). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Harris asserts that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to competent 
counsel because of counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict or an arrest of 
judgment. The evidence produced by the State at trial was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol and counsel was deficient in 
failing to move for a dismissal due to this insufficiency. In addition, had counsel made 




THE DEFENSE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO MOVE FOR A 
DIRECTED VERDICT AND/OR AN ARREST OF JUDGMENT 
CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL 
BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A 
CONVICTION FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL 
Harris asserts that she was denied her Sixth Amendment right to comptetent 
counsel because trial counsel failed to motion for a directed verdict at the close of the 
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State's evidence, and/or for judgment notwithstanding the verdict at the end of trial, 
when the evidence produced by the State at trial was insufficient to sustain a conviction 
for driving under the influence of alcohol. 
"A defendant raising an ineffectiveness claim must show first, that his counsel 
rendered a deficient performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance 
fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment and, second, that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. To establish prejudice, defendant must 
show a reasonable probability that except for ineffective counsel, the result would have 
been different." State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41, f 25, 1 P.3d 546. 
This test was first articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland 
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). As the 
Strickland two-prong test is being utilized, it should be remembered that the right to 
effective counsel is a crucial element of a criminal Defendant's Sixth Amendment rights 
and the focus of the review should be "on the fundamental fairness of the proceeding 
whose result is being challenged." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. at 2056; 
State v. Snyder, 860 P.2d 351, 354 (Utah App. 1993). Moreover, in determining 
whether Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel "this court cannot 
apply rigid mechanical rules, but instead must focus xon the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding whose result is being challenged.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 670, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2056; Snyder, 860 P.2d at 354. 
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A. The performance of Harris5 trial counsel fell below an objective standard of 
reasonableness. 
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, Harris must show that trial 
counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Strickland. 
466 U.S. at 689, 104 S.Ct. at 2065; State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461, 465 (Utah App. 
1993). To meet this prong, the defendant "must prove that specific, identified acts or 
omissions fall outside the wide range if professionally competent assistance." State v. 
Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Moreover, under the Sixth Amendment defendants are entitled to legal 
representation and ^assistance by a competent member of the Bar, who shows a 
willingness to identify himself with the interest of the accused and present such defenses 
as are available under the law." State v. Crestani, 111 P.2d 1085 (Utah App. 1989) 
(quoting State v. McNicol, 554 P.2d 203, 204 (Utah 1976)). Harris asserts that trial 
counsel's performance was objectively deficient based upon the following arguments: 
One, trial counsel failed to move for a directed verdict or an arrest of judgment 
(JNOV) when the evidence produced by the State at trial was insufficient to sustain a 
conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. For a defendant to preserve a 
sufficiency of evidence claim for appeal, trial counsel must have raised the issue by a 
proper motion or objection in the trial court. State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 
P.3d 346. Trial counsel's failure to adequately raise a sufficiency claim constituted 
deficient performance because the evidence was, in fact, insufficient to sustain the jury 
verdict. 
Harris asserts that an examination of all the evidence in a light most favorable to 
the jury verdict, the evidence is insufficient to find beyond a reasonable doubt that 
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Harris violated Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44. See State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 337, 
343 (Utah 1997). 
"A defendant's burden on appeal when challenging the sufficiency of the 
evidence after a jury trial is to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict and then 
demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the verdict." State v. Rudolph, 2000 UT App. 155, f 18, 3 P.3d 192. Counsel has 
marshaled the evidence in the statement of facts but also does so as necessary here. 
Although the State provided eyewitness testimony that Harris consumed not 
more than two beers prior to her driving (R. 136 at 16, 20), the State could not prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt that Harris was legally intoxicated under Utah Code 
Annotated § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i), when she drove her car to meet Robb. The State also 
provided no evidence that Harris was under the influence of alcohol and/or any drug to 
a degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating the vehicle as found in Utah 
Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii). 
Out of the three witnesses provided by the State, only Officer Van Fleet 
provided potentially damaging testimony to Harris. At no point in time did Officer Van 
Fleet observe Harris drive her vehicle (R. 136 at 99). Officer Van Fleet discovered 
that Harris was driving only after Harris initiated a 911 call to the police (R. 136 at 
130). Officer Van Fleet responded to the call and found Justin Robb at the scene (R. 
136 at 44-5). Robb informed the officer that Harris had been driving (R. 136 at 33). 
Officer Van Fleet testified that Harris stated to him that she drank before she drove and 
that she took her child with her to see Robb (R. 136 at 49-50). Officer Van Fleet 
testified he asked Harris if she had anything to drink since she last drove and she said 
no (R. 136 at 51). 
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At this point, Officer Van Fleet performed several field sobriety tests on Harris, 
all of which she failed (R. 136 at 53-62). Officer Van Fleet took Harris to the police 
station and performed an intoxilyzer test on Harris, which showed a .121 breath alcohol 
level (R. 103, 136 at 71). At the police station, it was clear that Harris was confused 
about what time it was (R. 136 at 74). Officer Van Fleet testified that at the police 
station, Harris never told him that she drank a quart of beer after she had driven to see 
Robb and before Officer Van Fleet arrived on the scene (R. 136 at 97). 
The State's first witness, Brandy Nebeker, testified that she and Harris were 
sunbathing together at Nebeker's home and during this time, Harris consumed "maybe 
a beer and a half. Not more than two beers" before Harris drove her vehicle to meet 
Robb. (R. 136 at 16, 20). After Harris met with Robb, she returned to Nebeker's house 
(R. 136 at 14-15). Nebeker testified that she had "no question" in her mind that Harris 
drank the quart of beer after she returned from meeting Robb (R. 136 at 25). 
The State's second witness, Justin Robb, testified that he told Officer Van Fleet 
that he thought Harris had been drinking and driving although Robb testified that he 
"never seen her with no alcohol in her presence at all," nor had he smelled alcohol on 
her breath (R. 136 at 29, 33). Robb also testified that when he was driving and 
following Harris, it did not appear to him that Harris was impaired while driving (R. 
136 at 34). 
Looking at all the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury verdict, 
reasonable minds could not have found Harris guilty of driving under the influence of 
alcohol because the State provided no evidence that Harris was driving under the 
influence of alcohol to a degree that she could not safely operate her vehicle. 
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In a case similar to the case at bar, State v. Boyd, 692 P.2d 769 (Utah 1984), the 
defendant appealed his conviction for driving under the influence of alcohol. At a 
dinner party, the defendant consumed between four to six goblets of wine, over a 
period about four to six hours that evening. Id. at 770. After the party broke up around 
11:30 p.m., the defendant was involved in a high speed chase with the cops. Id. The 
defendant evaded the cops, and was later arrested early the next morning at 7:00 a.m. 
Id. The police administered a breathalyzer test that indicated he had a .04 percent 
blood alcohol level. Id. 
The court found, "although the state presented evidence that [the] defendant had 
been drinking at the dinner party, every witness from the party testified that he was not 
intoxicated when he left." Id. at 771. The court also found that "there was no evidence 
at trial indicating that the four to six goblets of wine consumed by the defendant over 
the length of time would make him intoxicated." Id. The court further stated that no 
police officer examined the defendant to determine whether he was intoxicated and it 
was unclear whether the defendant was weaving across the rode. Boyd, 692 P.2d at 
772. The court held that the officer's "testimony, standing alone, is insufficient to 
support a guilty verdict." Id. The court reversed the conviction of driving under the 
influence of alcohol. Id. 
In the case at bar, it was proven by the State's own witness that Harris drank 
only two 12 ounce beers before she drove her car to see Robb. Moreover, the State 
provided no evidence that Harris was operating a vehicle under the influence of alcohol 
to a degree that rendered her incapable of safely operating the vehicle-particularly in 
view of Robb's testimony that he observed no impairment in Harris' driving. The State 
provided no expert witness to testify that two 12 ounce beers would be sufficient to 
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render Harris incapable of safely operating a vehicle. The State did not present any 
evidence whatsoever that two 12 ounce beers would render Harris incapable of safely 
operating a vehicle (R. 136 at 100). In fact, one of the State's witnesses testified that 
he followed Harris when she was driving and it did not appear to him that Harris was 
impaired while driving (R. 136 at 34). 
As in Boyd, where all of the witnesses testified that the defendant did not appear 
to be intoxicated, no eyewitness testified that Harris was intoxicated when she drove 
her vehicle (R. 136 at 34). Accordingly, Harris asserts that there was insufficient 
evidence to sustain a verdict that she was guilty under Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-
4(2)(a)(ii) at the end of the State's evidence. 
There was also insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Harris's blood alcohol level was .08 or greater when she drove her vehicle. Although 
it is true that Officer Van Fleet performed an intoxilyzer test on Harris, resulting in a 
blood level greater than .08 (R. 136 at 71), the State provided contradictory evidence 
that Harris drank the quart of beer before she drove her vehicle (R. 136 at 25, 75). 
Nebeker testified that she was certain that she saw Harris drink the quart of beer after 
Harris finished driving (R. 136 at 25). Because Officer Van Fleet neither witnessed 
Harris drive her vehicle nor consume any alcohol or have any alcohol in her 
possession, Officer Van Fleet had to rely on his memory of what Harris told him 
shortly after he arrived at the scene (R. 136 at 99, 101, 105-6). At the time that 
Officer Van Fleet questioned Harris, it was clear that she was getting her times 
confused (R. 136 at 74), yet the State's only evidence that Harris drove the car after 
drinking the two 12 ounce cans of beer and the quart of beer was the statement that 
Harris made to Officer Van Fleet (R. 136 at 102). 
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The State provided insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Harris violated Utah Code Annotated § 41-6-44(2)(a)(i). At the end of the State's 
evidence, Counsel for the defense should have moved for a directed verdict, but failed 
to do so (R. 136 at 115-16). 
After the State rested, Harris took the standi Harris's testimony showed that she 
did in fact drink two 12 ounce cans of beer prior to driving her vehicle (R. 136 at 125). 
Harris testified that she felt she was not under the influence to the point that she could 
not operate her vehicle safely (R. 136 at 125). Harris also testified that she drank a 
quart of beer after she drove her vehicle and before Officer Van Fleet arrived at the 
scene (R. 136 at 130). Harris further testified that she failed to tell Officer Van Fleet 
that she drank the quart of beer after she drove her car because she did not think that 
she was being arrested for driving under the influence (R. 136 at 134-5). Harris 
believed that she was being arrested for a prior warrant (R. 136 at 153). Harris 
testified that she believed she was being questioned to determine what occurred between 
her and Robb (R. 136 at 152-3). Harris testified that she did not receive the DUI 
citation until she was already put in jail (R. 136 at 153 ). Officer Van Fleet testified 
that he did not give her a copy of the DUI citation until 7:20 p.m., a time after the 
questioning had been completed (R. 136 at 94-5). 
The testimony provided by Harris confirmed that she only drank two 12 ounce 
cans of beer before she drove her vehicle, and that she drank about a quart of beer after 
she drove her vehicle (R. 136 at 125). The jury also heard the State's witness testify 
that Harris drank the quart of beer after she drove her vehicle. The State could not 
provide any witness to testify that they saw or had proof that Harris drank a quart of 
beer before she drove her vehicle. The State's only testimony that Harris drove 
18 
intoxicated was Officer Van Fleet's testimony concerning the time frames that Harris 
gave him. And the State already presented evidence that Harris was confused and 
giving incorrect time information. 
The jury had insufficient evidence to convict Harris for violating Sec 41-6-
44(2)(a)(ii) since the State offered evidence in support that Harris did not violate this 
section. A reasonable jury also could not find that Harris violated Sec 41-6-44(2)(a)(i) 
Accordingly, Harris's defense counsel failure to move for a directed verdict and/or an 
arrest of judgment therefore constituted a deficient performance under the Strickland 
standard (R. 136 at 115-16). 
B. Harris was prejudiced by the deficient representation of trial counsel. 
The second prong of the Strickland test is satisfied only by showing there is a 
reasonable probability that "but for counsel's errors, the result of the proceeding would 
have been different." Frame, 723 P.2d at 405. A reasonable probability has been 
described as that "sufficient to undermine the confidence in the outcome." See 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Fame, 723 P.2d at 405. Harris asserts 
that he was prejudiced by trial counsel's deficient performance, and as a result, was 
denied a reasonable probability of a different result that is sufficient to undermine this 
Court's confidence in the outcome. 
Harris was prejudiced by trial counsel's failure to move for a directed verdict at 
the close of the State's case and/or for an arrest of judgment after the jury's verdict 
because had trial counsel made such a motion the charge would have been dismissed by 
the trial court because the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction. 
Accordingly, Harris would have enjoyed a more favorable result. See, e.g., State v. 
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Finlayson, 2000 UT 10, f25, 994 P.2d 1243 (objection to sufficiency of evidence on 
aggravated kidnapping charge would have precluded conviction and prejudiced die 
defendant). 
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
For the foregoing reasons, Harris asks that this Court reverse her conviction of 
driving under the influence, a Class A misdemeanor. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 15th day of July, 2002. 
Margaret^P. Lindsay 
Counsel for Appellant ( 
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41-6-44.1 MOTOR VEHICLES 
& -
(9) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty or 
no contest to a charge of a violation of Section 
41-6-45, of an ordinance enacted under Section 41-6-
43, or of Section 41-6-44.6 in satisfaction of, or as a 
substitute for, an original charge of a violation of this 
section, the prosecution shall state for the record a 
factual basis for the plea, including whether of not 
there had been consumption of alcohol, drugs," or a 
combination of both, by the defendant in connection 
with the violation. 
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts 
that shows whether there was consumption of alco-
hol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant, 
in connection with the violation. 
(b) The court shall advise the defendant before accept-
ing the plea offered under this Subsection (9Kb) of the 
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or of 
Section 41-6-45. 
(c) The court shall notify the Driver License Division of 
each conviction of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 entered 
under this Subsection (9). 
(10) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person 
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable 
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his 
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that 
the violation was committed by the person. 
(11) (a) The Driver License Division shall: 
(i) suspend for 90 days the operators license of a 
person convicted for the first time under Subsection 
(2); 
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person 
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection 
(2) if the violation is committed within a period often 
years from the date of the prior violation; and 
(iii) suspend or revoke the license of a person as 
ordered by the court under Subsection (12). 
(b) The Driver License Division shall subtract from any 
suspension or revocation period the number of days for 
which a license was previously suspended under Section 
53-3-223 or 53-3-231, if the previous suspension was 
based on the same occurrence upon which the record of 
conviction is based. 
(12) (a) In addition to any other penalties provided in this 
section, a court may order the operator's license of a 
person who is convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) to 
be suspended or revoked for an additional period of 90 
days, 180 days, one year, or two years to remove from the 
highways those persons who have shown they are safety 
hazards. 
(b) If the court suspends or revokes the person's license 
under this Subsection (12)(b), the court shall prepare and 
send to the Driver License Division an order to suspend or 
revoke that person's driving privileges for a specified 
period of time. 
(13) (a) If the court orders a person to participate in home 
confinement through the use of electronic monitoring, the 
electronic monitoring shall alert the appropriate correc-
tions, probation monitoring agency, law enforcement 
units, or contract provider of the defendant's where-
abouts. 
(b) The electronic monitoring device shall be used un-
der conditions which require: 
(i) the person to wear an electronic monitoring 
device at all times; 
(ii) that a device be placed in the home or other 
specified location of the person, so that the person's 
compliance with the court's order may be monitored; 
and 
(iii) the person to pay the costs of the 
monitoring. 
(c) The court shall order the appropriate 
scribed in Subsection (13Xe) to place an el< 
toring device on the person and install el _ 
toring equipment in the residence of the person 
specified location. 
(d) The court may: 
(i) require the person's electronic home _ 
device to include a substance abuse testing 
ment; 
(ii) restrict the amount of alcohol the pert* 
consume during the time the person is 
home confinement; 
(iii) set specific time and location condit _ 
allow the person to attend school educational _ 
or employment and to travel directly betwtoi 
activities and the person's home; and 
(iv) waive all or part of the costs associate 
home confinement if the person is determine 
indigent by the court. 
(e) The electronic monitoring described in this 
may either be administered directly by the aj 
corrections agency, probation monitoring agency 
contract with a private provider. 
(f) The electronic monitoring provider shall 
costs of waivers by the court under Subsection 
(14) (a) If supervised probation is ordered under 
41-6-44.6 or Subsection (4Xe) or (5)(e): * 
(i) the court shall specify the period of tat 
tion; 
(ii) the person shall pay ail of the 
probation; and 
(iii) the court may order any other condition!" 
probation. 
(b) The court shall provide the probation 
this section by contract with a probation 
agency or a private probation provider. 
(c) The probation provider described in 
(14)(b) shall monitor the person's compliance 
conditions of the person's sentence, conditions of 
tion, and court orders received under this artick 
notify the court of any failure to comply with or 
that sentence or those conditions or orders. 
(d) (i) The court may waive all or part of Ail, 
associated with probation if the person is 
to be indigent by th» court. 
(ii) The probation provider described in 
(14Kb) shall cover the costs of waivers by 
under Subsection (14)(dXi). 
(15) If a person is convicted of a violation of Si 
and there is admissible evidence that the person had • 
alcohol level of .16 or higher, then if the court doesn*' 
(a) treatment as described under Subsection 
(5Kd), or (6)(b)(iii), then the court shall enter tht; 
on the record; and 
(b) the following penalties, the court shall «• 
reasons on the record: ^ 
(i) the installation of an ignition interior 
as a condition of probation for the person * 
dance with Section 41-6-44.7; or 
(ii) the imposition of home confinement 
the use of electronic monitoring in accordtf**i 
Subsection (13). 
41-6-44.1. Procedures — Adjudicative pr 
The Department of Public Safety shall comply^™ 
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 4o*„ 
adjudicative proceedings. 
41-6-44.2. Repealed. ' " ^ 
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(i) the name, age, sex, and city of residence of each 
person involved in the accident; 
(ii) the make and model year of each vehicle in-
volved in the accident; 
(iii) whether or not each person involved in the 
accident was covered by a vehicle insurance policy; 
(iv) the location of the accident; and 
(v) a description of the accident that excludes per-
sonal identifying information not listed in Subsection 
(3)(c)(i). 
(4) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (4Kb), accident 
reports filed under this section may not be used as 
evidence in any civil or criminal trial arising out of an 
accident. 
(b) Upon demand of any party to the trial or upon 
demand of any court, the department shall furnish a 
certificate showing that a specified accident report has or 
has not been made to the department in compliance with 
law. If the report has been made, the certificate furnished 
by the department shall show the date, time, and location 
of the accident, the names and addresses of the drivers, 
the owners of the vehicles involved, and the investigating 
officers. The reports may be used as evidence when 
necessary to prosecute charges filed in connection with a 
violation of Subsection (5). 
(5) A person who gives information in reports as required in 
this chapter knowing or having reason to believe that the 
information is false is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 2001 
41-6-41. Statistical information regarding accidents — 
Annual publication. 
The depar tment shall tabulate and may analyze all accident 
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent 
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and 
circumstances of traffic accidents. 1987 
41-6-42. Local powers to require report. 
A local authority may by ordinance require tha t the operator 
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the 
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a 
report of the accident or a copy of any report required under 
this article to be filed with the department on accidents 
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confi-
dential use of the municipal department and are subject to 
Section 41-6-40. 2001 
ARTICLE 5 
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS 
DRIVING 
41-6-43. Local DUI and related ordinances and reck-
less driving ordinances — Consistent with 
code. 
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a 
motor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under 
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence 
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of 
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or 
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any 
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the 
provisions in this code which govern those matters. 
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs 
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton 
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be 
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those 
matters . 1987 
41-6-43.5. Definitions. 
As used in this article, "vehicle" or "motor vehicle 
addition to the definitions provided under Section 41 





Driving under the influence of alcohol, d-
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol 
centrat ion — Measurement of blood or 
alcohol — Criminal punishment 
without warrant — Penal t i es — Susp* 
or revocat ion of l icense. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "educational series" means an educational 
obtained at a substance abuse program that is app-
by the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance 
Section 62A-8-107; 
(b) "prior conviction" means any conviction for a ' 
tion of: 
(i) this section; 
(ii) alcohol-related reckless driving under S 
tions (9) and (10); 
(iii) local ordinances similar to this section or 
hoi-related reckless driving adopted in conr 
with Section 41-6-43; 
(iv) automobile homicide under Section 7 
or 
(v) statutes or ordinances in effect in any 
state, the United States, or any district, pos-
or territory of the United States which would 
tute a violation of this section or alcohol-
reckless driving if committed in this state, incl" 
punishments administered under 10 U.S.C. Sec 
(c) "screening and assessment" means a sub 
abuse addiction and dependency screening and 
ment obtained at a substance abuse program 
approved by the Board of Substance Abuse in ac_ 
with Section 62A-8-107; 
(d) "serious bodily injury" means bodily injury 
creates or causes serious permanent disfigurement, 
tracted loss or impairment of the function of any * 
member or organ, or creates a substantial risk of 
(e) "substance abuse treatment" means treat" 
tained at a substance abuse program that is app 
the Board of Substance Abuse in accordance with 
62A-8-107; 
(f) "substance abuse treatment program" means 1 
licensed substance abuse program; 
(g) a violation of this section includes a violation 
a local ordinance similar to this section adopted in 
pliance with Section 41-6-43; and 
(h) the standard of negligence is that of simpte 
gence, the failure to exercise that degree of care * 
ordinarily reasonable and prudent person exercises 
like or similar circumstances. 
(2) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual pn 
control of a vehicle within this state if the person: 
(i) has sufficient alcohol in his body that a c 
test given within two hours of the alleged opera 
physical control shows that the person has a 
breath alcohol concentration of .08 grams or 
or 
(ii) is under the influence of alcohol, any a* 
the combined influence of alcohol and any drug 
degree that renders the person incapable of 
operating a vehicle, 
(b) The fact that a person charged with violate? 
section is or has been legally entitled to use alco 
23 MOTOR ^ 
drug is n o t a defense against any charge of violating this 
section. 
,c) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based 
upon grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and 
alcohol concentration in the breath shall be based upon 
grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
,3) <a> A person convicted the first or second time of a 
violation of Subsection (2) is guilty of a: 
(i) class B misdemeanor; or 
(ii) class A misdemeanor if the person: 
(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon an-
other as a proximate result of having operated 
the vehicle in a negligent manner; 
(B) had a passenger under 16 years of age in 
the vehicle at the time of the offense; or 
(C) was 21 years of age or older and had a 
passenger under 18 years of age in the vehicle at 
the time of the offense. 
(b) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (2) is 
guilty of a third degree felony if the person has also 
inflicted serious bodily injury upon another as a proxi-
mate result of having operated the vehicle in a negligent 
manner. 
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall, 
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence 
of not less than 48 consecutive hours. 
(b) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a 
jail sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program 
for not less than 24 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Sub-
section (13). 
(c) In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-ser-
vice work program, or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening 
and assessment; 
(ii) order the person to participate in an educa-
tional series if the court does not order substance 
abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
I (4)(d); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $700. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance 
.„. abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment pro-
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is ap-
propriate. 
(e) (i) Except as provided in Subsection (4)(e)(ii), the 
court may order probation for the person in accor-
dance with Subsection (14). 
(ii) If there is admissible evidence that the person 
had a blood alcohol level of .16 or higher, the court 
shall order probation for the person in accordance 
with Subsection (14). 
*"> U) If a person is convicted under Subsection (2) within 
ten years of a prior conviction under this section, the court 
s
«all as part of any sentence impose a mandatory jail 
sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours. 
. to) The court may, as an alternative to all or part of a 
J*1* sentence, require the person to: 
(i) work in a compensatory-service work program 
for not less than 240 hours; or 
(ii) participate in home confinement through the 
use of electronic monitoring in accordance with Sub-
{ section (13). 
c> In addition to the jail sentence, compensatory-ser-
{ Ce Work program, or home confinement, the court shall: 
(i) order the person to participate in a screening 
and assessment; 
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(ii) order the person to participate in an educa-
tional series if the court does not order substance 
abuse treatment as described under Subsection 
(5Xd); and 
(iii) impose a fine of not less than $800. 
(d) The court may order the person to obtain substance 
abuse treatment if the substance abuse treatment pro-
gram determines that substance abuse treatment is ap-
propriate. 
(e) The court shall order probation for the person in 
accordance with Subsection (14). 
(6) (a) A conviction for a violation of Subsection (2) is a 
third degree felony if it is committed: 
(i) within ten years of two or more prior convictions 
under this section; or 
(ii) at any time after a conviction of: 
(A) automobile homicide under Section 76-5-
207 that is committed after July 1, 2001; or 
(B) a felony violation under this section that is 
committed after July 1, 2001. 
(b) Under Subsection (3)(b) or (6)(a), if the court sus-
pends the execution of a prison sentence and places the 
defendant on probation the court shall impose: 
(i) a fine of not less than $1,500; and 
(ii) a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 1,500 
hours. 
(c) For Subsection (6)(a) or (b), the court shall impose 
an order requiring the person to obtain a screening and 
assessment and substance abuse treatment at a sub-
stance abuse treatment program providing intensive care 
or inpatient treatment and long-term closely supervised 
follow-through after treatment for not less than 240 
hours. 
(d) In addition to the penalties required under Subsec-
tion (6)(b), the court may require the person to participate 
in home confinement through the use of electronic moni-
toring in accordance with Subsection (13). 
(7) The mandatory portion of any sentence required under 
this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is 
not eligible for parole or probation until any sentence imposed 
under this section has been served. Probation or parole 
resulting from a conviction for a violation under this section 
may not be terminated. 
(8) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), and (6) 
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted 
person to: participate in a screening and assessment; 
and an educational series; obtain, in the discretion of 
the court, substance abuse treatment; obtain, man-
datorily, substance abuse treatment; or do a combi-
nation of those things, apply to a conviction for a 
violation of Section 41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Sub-
section (9). 
(ii) The court shall render the same order regard-
ing screening and assessment, an educational series, 
or substance abuse treatment in connection with a 
first, second, or subsequent conviction under Section 
41-6-44.6 or 41-6-45 under Subsection (9), as the 
court would render in connection with applying re-
spectively, the first, second, or subsequent conviction 
requirements of Subsections (4), (5), and (6). 
(b) If a person fails to complete all court ordered 
screening and assessment, educational series, and sub-
stance abuse treatment, or fails to pay all fines and fees, 
including fees for restitution and treatment costs, the 
court shall notify the Driver License Division of a failure 
to comply. Upon receiving the notification, the division 
shall suspend the person's driving privilege in accordance 
with Subsections 53-3-221(2) and (3). 
INSTRUCTION NO. \?£-
The following are the elements of the crime of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS: 
1. The defendant operated a vehicle; and 
2. The defendant was in the state of Utah when she operated a vehicle; and 
3. The defendant, while operating a vehicle: 
(a) had sufficient alcohol in her body that a chemical test given within two hours of 
the defendant operating a vehicle shows that the defendant had a breath alcohol 
concentration of .08 grams or greater of alcohol for each 210 liters of breath; or 
(b) was under the influence of alcohol and/or any drug to a degree that rendered her 
incapable of safely operating the vehicle. 
If you find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the foregoing elements of 
that crime, you must find the defendant guilty of the crime of DRIVING UNDER THE 
INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS. 
If you do not find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the foregoing 
elements, you must find the defendant not guilty of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF 
ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS. 
